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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. A French electric company de-
cides to build a new electric plant. It receives a long-term commit-
ment from an American oil supplier with whom it has a long-stand-
ing relationship. The American oil company views the long-term
contract as a means to finance an ongoing oil exploration project.
However, the oil company is concerned about fluctuation in the
price of oil and wants to incorporate some flexibility into the con-
tract. The French electric company is willing to absorb some in-
crease in cost so long as its oil supply is uninterrupted.
How can the American lawyer for the oil company and the
French lawyer for the electric company ensure the success of their
clients' project? French and American lawyers can avail themselves
of a number of methods to insure against unforeseen circumstances.
American lawyers can draft flexible pricing clauses, option con-
tracts and clauses limiting liability.1 French lawyers can draft
clauses de maintien de valeur (value maintenance), de hausse et de
baisse (rise and fall), and of course, force majeure clauses.2 This
article considers an additional option: the hardship clause.
A typical hardship clause has two aspects: (1) a definition of
hardship and (2) a method to adapt the contract to accommodate
the changed circumstances. Bruno Oppetit offers the following
description of a hardship clause:
* Associate, Fox & Horan, New York. B.A. 1985, J.D. 1988, Columbia University. The
author completed this article while clerking for the French firm of Simeon Moquet Bord6 et
Associ6s in Paris and appreciates the advice he received on French aspects of this article. In
addition, the author would like to thank E. Allan Farnsworth, Alfred McCormack Professor
of Law at the Columbia University School of Law, for his advice on American aspects of this
article.
1. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 648 (1982). A flexible pricing clause allows a party to
pass additional costs on to the other party. Id. An option contract is an irrevocable offer
supported by consideration and limited to a specific time. Id. at 172-73. Clauses limiting
liability limit the remedies available to a party in case of breach. Id. at 316.
2. B. OPPETIT, L'ADAPTATION DES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX AUX CHANGEMENTS
DE CIRCONSTANCES: LA CLAUSE DE "HARDSHIP" 794, 795-96 (1972). For an explanation of
force majeure, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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A hardship clause may be defined as a clause by which parties
will be able to request a rearrangement of the contract that binds
them if an intervening change in the initial basis on which they
obligated themselves modifies the equilibrium of the contract to
the point that one of the parties sustains a hardship.3
Hardship clauses are found in many types of contracts: commercial;
construction; insurance; commodities; offshore; license/patent; and
international joint ventures. Scholars agree, however, that hardship
clauses are most useful in long-term fuel supply contracts.4 Fuel
supply contracts are subject to a great deal of uncertainty, and this
uncertainty is compounded over time. Moreover, fuel supply con-
tracts are often the basis of other contracts (e.g., exploration fi-
nance contracts and energy facility construction contracts), and
parties would rather integrate some flexibility into their contracts
than to terminate a project or breach an agreement.
Thus, hardship clauses have two obvious advantages. First, they
afford parties a flexible approach to deal with unforeseen circum-
stances. Second, they provide a framework for parties to renegoti-
ate. The most common criticism of hardship clauses is that they
create instability by inserting ambiguity into contracts.5 Such criti-
cism is blunted by the fact that hardship clauses are most often
introduced in transactions that are themselves subject to a great
deal of uncertainty. Moreover, hardship clauses can be drafted
broadly or narrowly to fit the situation.6
A more penetrating question is whether hardship clauses accom-
plish any more than what parties can achieve by postcontractual
modification. Both the French and the American legal systems rec-
ognize that parties can renegotiate all or part of a contract and
alter the terms of a preexisting agreement. Why use a hardship
clause? The answer is that absent a hardship clause, parties are not
required to modify their contract or even to engage in negotiations
to revise the contract.7 Furthermore, courts are reticent to engage
3. Id. at 797.
La clause de "hardship" peut se d6finir comme celle aux termes de laquelle les
parties pourront demander un rCam~nagement du contrat qui les lie si un change-
ment intervenu dans les donn6s initiales au regard desquelles elles s'6taient engag6es
vient A modifier l'quilibre de ce contrat au point de faire subir i l'une d'elles une
rigueur ("hardship") injuste.
4. See infra notes 5 & 10.
5. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW [UNCI-
TRAL], Legal Guide on Drawing up International Contracts for the Construction of Indus-
trial Works 241 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL].
6. See infra notes II & 12.
7. Richard Speidel observes:
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in modification that was not agreed upon by the parties at the time
of contracting.'
This line of questioning reveals that hardship clauses are superior
to normal postcontractual modification only to the extent that they
are enforceable. The purpose of this article is to discuss the en-
forceability of hardship clauses. The article answers two major
questions: (1) what is a hardship clause? and (2) what happens if
parties cannot agree upon a solution to the hardship?
I. WHAT IS A HARDSHIP CLAUSE?
Unlike force majeure in French law and impossibility in common
law, hardship is not a legal concept. It is a descriptive phrase for an
event that befalls one of the parties. While the French use the word
"hardship" for lack of a better term,9 Americans prefer the phrase
"gross inequity" clause.10
Because it is not a legal concept with a fixed meaning, hardship
can be defined narrowly11 or broadly. 2 While often framed in
Assume that after changes occur which upset the balance struck ex ante in a long-
term contract, the disadvantaged party initiates negotiations and ultimately pro-
poses an adjustment in the price term. What should the advantaged party do?
Under the efficiency analysis and traditional contract law, he may refuse to negoti-
ate or adjust without legal consequences. No duties are imposed upon the ad-
vantaged party in the ex post bargaining process.
Speidel, Court Imposed Price Adjustments in Long Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L.
REV. 369, 404 (1981).
8. Id. at 408.
9. See Fontaine, The Hardship Clause, 2 DROIT ET PRATIQUE DE COMMERCE INTER-
NATIONAL [DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L] 51, 53 (1976). Fontaine argues that none of the suggested
translations (e.g., clause d'imprivision (unforeseeability clause), clause de sauvegarde (safe-
guard clause), and clause de r&ision (revision clause)) accurately describe the hardship
clause.
Nonetheless, French attorneys should be aware that such clauses are often, in essence,
hardship clauses. In I DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L 512 (1976), Fontaine lists a number of clauses
with various names, all calling for renegotiation and all triggered by a hardship. Thus law-
yers searching for models should consider many clauses, not merely those entitled "hardship
clauses."
10. See generally Young, Construction and Enforcement of Long-Term Coal Supply
Agreements, 27A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 127 (1982); Scott, Coal Supply Agreements,
23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 107 (1977).
Gross inequity clauses appear in the following cases: Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Exxon
Nuclear Co., 753 F.2d 493, 495 (6th Cir. 1985) (supplier of uranium sues T.V.A. for com-
pensation for increased production costs); Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. I.C.C., 664 F.2d 568
(6th Cir. 1981) (railroad sues ICC for increased freight rates); Iowa Power & Light Co. v.
Burlington N., Inc., 647 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (hold-
ing that an established railroad tariff rate approved by the ICC does not prevail over a rate
enumerated in a preexisting contract with a gross inequity clause); Southwestern Elec. Co. v.
Burlington N., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (upholding rate negotiated by preex-
isting contract with a hardship clause where ICC neither approved nor disapproved of rate).
11. An example of a narrowly drawn clause is: "[Sli le prix du fuel subissait une
hausse ou une baisse de plus de 6 francs A la tonne, les parties se rapprocheraient pour
1988]
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terms of economic consequences, hardship clauses can take into ac-
count noneconomic eventualities as well." American and French
clauses often require an element of unforeseeability. In addition,
French clauses include an element of extbriorit (the event be be-
yond the parties' control)4 Bruno Oppetit notes that French hard-
ship clauses often resemble French force majeure clauses. 5
The most common means to adapt the contract in both French
and American clauses is by an agreement to renegotiate. There is,
however, a great deal of variation in how the duty to renegotiate is
articulated. Sometimes the duty is broad, other times it is narrow. 6
Nonetheless, it is this duty to renegotiate that distinguishes hard-
ship clauses from normal force majeure clauses, which provide for
termination of the contract.
II. WHAT HAPPENS IF PARTIES CANNOT AGREE UPON A
SOLUTION TO THE HARDSHIP?
This is a complex question which is best divided into three issues:
(1) how would a court interpret a hardship clause? (2) what is the
"duty to renegotiate," and what happens if a party breaches that
examiner les modifications A apporter au contrat..." ("If the price of fuel sustains a rise or
fall of more than 6 francs a ton, the parties shall come together to examine the modifications
to be brought to the contract.") See E.D.F. c. St6. Shell Franqaise, Cour de cassation
[Cass.], La Semaine Juridique [J.C.P.] II No. 18810 (1976) note J. Robert. This case is
discussed more fully infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
12. An example of a broadly drafted clause is: "[A]ny gross proven inequity that may
result in unusual economic conditions not contemplated by the parties at the time of the
execution of this Agreement may be corrected by mutual consent .. " Georgia Power Co.
v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101, 103 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952
(1976).
13. For example: "[dians le cas de la survenance d'&v6nements politiques exterieurs ou
int6rieurs" ("[i]n the case of supervening foreign or domestic political events"). Fontaine, 2
DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L, supra note 9, at 64.
14. The elements of unforeseeability and ext&rioritk are included in the following
hardship clause: "Les conditions de la present convention pourront atre revues de commun
accord si un 6v~nement impr6visible et 6tranger aux parties .. " ("The terms of the pres-
ent agreement may be reviewed by mutual agreement if an unforeseeable and external event
.... ) 1 DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L 512 (1976).
15. B. OPPETIT, supra note 2, at 802. French and American attorneys should be wary
of drafting hardship clauses merely by repeating the formulae of force majeure clauses. This
may lead to a "conflict of clauses" in which one party argues that a certain event triggers
termination under the force majeure clause while the other party argues that the event trig-
gers renegotiation under the hardship clause.
16. Compare "[lies parties auraient A se mettre d'accord sur une adaptation du prix"
("the parties would have to agree to an adjustment of the price"), with "[lies parties se
consulteront afin de trouver en commun des ajustements Equitables A cet accord" ("the par-
ties will consult for the purpose of finding together equitable adjustments to this agree-
ment"). The former clause requires parties to renegotiate the price while the latter clause
can involve revision of the entire contract.
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4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol19/iss1/6
HARDSHIP CLAUSES
duty? and (3) what happens if parties cannot agree to a
modification?
A. How Would A Court Interpret a Hardship Clause?
This problem of interpretation troubles French and American
scholars.17 However, in the French and American cases cited above,
the courts were not forced to wrestle with the issue of whether
hardship occurred. 18 The meaning of hardship would obviously be a
question of contract interpretation. To interpret a hardship clause,
French and American attorneys need to know both the rules of con-
tract interpretation used in the common law and French legal sys-
tems; and common law and French understanding of force majeure
and impossibility.
Since hardship is not a legal concept, courts will analogize to
force majeure or impossibility for guidance in interpreting a hard-
ship clause.1 Although this practice is tempting, courts are urged
not to replace a sophisticated analysis of the meaning of hardship
with a facile recapitulation of the factors required for force
majeure and impossibility. While force majeure and impossibility
17. See UNCITRAL, supra note 5.
18. See cases cited supra notes 10 & 11. The meaning of "hardship" was disputed in
the English case, Superior Overseas Development Corp. v. British Gas Corp., [1982] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 262 (C.A.). The case involved a long-term natural gas supply agreement that
included a hardship clause triggered in the event of "substantial economic hardship." The
lower court held: "[tihe adjustment of the price should only be such as to remove the sub-
stantial element of any substantial hardship and thus reduce any substantial hardship to
mere hardship. The adjustment should not go further and remove all hardship." Id. at 262.
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that all hardships should be compensated. The
court began by defining "substantial economic hardship": "A substantial change in economic
circumstances means something more than ordinary everyday variations which were current
in the late '60s. 'Substantial hardship' must mean something more than difficulties arising
from day to day economic variations. It must have a real impact and not be a mere transient
effect." Id. at 266. The court then proceeded to explain why all hardships should be
compensated:
Having found that the party was suffering from substantial hardship, it is next nec-
essary to determine what adjustment to the price is justified to 'offset or alleviate
the said hardship.' In my opinion the said hardship refers to the substantial hard-
ship mentioned earlier in the clause, and offsetting or alleviating refers to a condi-
tion of normality, that is to say without hardship, not merely without the substantial
part of the hardship.
Id.
19. In Superior Overseas Development Corp., for example, Lord Justice Waller found
the hardship clause contained an element of unforeseeability even though the clause itself did
not specify this element: "It seems probable, therefore, that cl. 7 [the hardship clause] is
designed to adjust the price to avoid substantial economic hardship to any party which might
arise as a result of substantial economic change which might arise over a period of 25 years
and which could not be foreseen at the time of making the agreement." Id. at 265. Unfore-
seeability is an important characteristic of common law impossibility. See E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 1, at 686.
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have fixed legal requirements, hardship is a more flexible concept
that generally applies when a change of circumstances makes per-
formance of a contract grossly inequitable.
1. French Law
a. Rules of Interpretation. The interpretation of contracts in
French law is governed by articles 1156-1164 of the Code civil. The
centerpiece is article 1156, which provides that courts should take
into account the "common intention of the parties." 0 This statute
can be the basis for a broad interpretation of a hardship clause.
Consider a seller whose performance becomes onerous due to a
change in import quotas, and assume that the hardship clause
speaks only of "hardship by a change in economic circumstances."
The seller could cite article 1156 and argue that the purpose of a
hardship clause is to integrate flexibility within a contract, requir-
ing the court to consider substantial changes in political circum-
stances as well as economic circumstances.
Balancing a broad interpretation under article 1156 is the doc-
trine of clause claire et prbcise. 1 This doctrine states that a clear
and precise clause is interpreted by its plain meaning. Clause claire
et precise may be employed by a buyer to achieve a narrow inter-
pretation of a hardship clause. Suppose the seller's costs rise three
percent beyond the costs foreseen by an indexation clause, and the
hardship clause speaks only of a hardship beyond a five percent rise
in costs calculated by the indexation clause. The buyer would argue
that the hardship clause is a clause claire et prcise, triggered only
by a five percent increase in cost.
Like common law, French law recognizes certain preferences in
interpreting contracts. For long-term sales contracts the most sig-
nificant rule is article 1602, which states that vague and ambiguous
20. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1156 (Dalloz ed. 1982). Article 1156 states, "On doit
dans les conventions rechercher quelle a 6t6 la commune intention des parties contractantes,
plut6t que de s'arreter au sens littral des termes." ("One must, in contracts, seek to deter-
mine the common intention of the contracting parties, rather than stop at the literal sense of
the terms.")
21. Alex Weill describes the doctrine thus: "Lorsqu'une clause A U6 valablement ac-
cept6e par les deux parties et qu'elle est claire et pr6cise, elle doit 8tre appliqu~e telle quelle,
A moins qu'elle ne soit illicite. En principe il n'y a pas de place pour l'interpr6tation d'un
contrat r~vlant par sa lettre et son esprit la commune intention des contractants." ("Once a
clause has been validly adopted by the two parties and it is clear and precise, it must be
enforced as is, unless it is unlawful. In principle there is no place for the interpretation of a
contract which reveals by its letter and spirit the common intention of the contracting par-
ties.") A. WEILL. LES OBLIGATIONS 404 (1980).
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phrases will be construed against the seller."2 This creates difficulty
for the seller who, more often than not, is the party claiming hard-
ship."3 The seller's attorney must skillfully draft a clause broad
enough to encompass all aspects of conceivable hardship, but nar-
row enough to avoid invoking article 1602.
b. Force Majeure. The French law of force majeure is based on
article 1148.2" The classical requirements of force majeure are enu-
merated by Jean Carbonnier: "An event only constitutes a force
majeure if it presents the threefold quality of being 1) insurmount-
able, 2) unforeseeable (which is expressed more specifically by for-
tuitous circumstance), and 3) beyond the parties' control (this is
how the force majeure is an external cause)." 5
Hardship clauses often include the requirement of imprvisibilit
(unforeseeability). The rationale for requiring imprbvisibilit is
that if an occurrence is foreseeable, then the party should take pre-
cautions to avoid it.26
22. C. civ. art. 1602 (Dalloz ed. 1982). Article 1602 states: "Le vendeur est tenu
d'expliquer clairement ce A quoi il s'oblige. Tout pacte obscur ou ambigu s'interprate contre
le vendeur." ("The seller is obliged to explain clearly that which he obligated himself to do.
All obscure and ambiguous agreements are to be interpreted against the seller.")
23. Hardship clauses are often referred to as "sellers' clauses." Yet this is not always
the case. In the event of a plunge in the market price of a necessary raw material, or a sharp
decline in demand for the buyer's finished product, the buyer will find a hardship clause a
valuable instrument for renegotiation.
In the context of international construction contracts, however, the UNCITRAL Legal
Guide concludes that hardship clauses are more advantageous to contractors than to
purchasers:
A hardship clause may have particular disadvantages for a purchaser. While the
purchaser has usually to perform only a single principal obligation (i.e., to pay the
price), the contractor has to perform a number of obligations in the course of con-
structing the works. The contractor, therefore, will potentially have more opportuni-
ties to invoke the hardship clause than the purchaser. Accordingly, before agreeing
to the inclusion of a hardship clause in the contract, the purchaser should carefully
consider the possible adverse effects to him of that clause.
UNCITRAL, supra note 5, at 243.
24. C. civ. art. 1148 (Dalloz ed. 1982). Article 1148 states: "I1 n'y a lieu i aucune
dommages et int6rets lorsque, par suite d'une force majeure ou d'un cas fortuit, le d6biteur a
6 empech6 de donner ou de faire ce A quoi il 6tait oblig6, ou a fait ce qui lui 6tait interdit."("There will be no place for an award of damages, if by a force majeure or a fortuitous
circumstance the obligor was prevented from giving or doing that which he was obligated, or
did that which he was forbidden to do.")
25. J. CARBONNIER, LEs OBLIGATIONS 290 (1985). "Un Mvnement ne constitue une
force majeure que s'il pr6sente le triple caract6re d'irrsistibilit6 (A quoi fait plus proprement
allusion l'expression force majeure, vis major), d'impr6visibilit6 (ce qu'exprime plus sp6cial-
ment cas fortuit), d'ext6riorit6 (c'est en quoi la force majeure est une cause 6trang~re)."
26. Jean Carbonnier observes:
II n'y a de force majeure qu'autant que l'obstacle ichappait, lors de la conclusion du
contrat, A des pr6visions humaines. Car, s'il 6tait pr~visible, le d~biteur avait le de-
voir de prendre le surcrolt de pr6cautions qui auraient pu I'Nviter; A la limite, il
devait s'abstenir de contracter plut6t que de braver le risque.(There can only be force majeure to the extent that an obstacle is beyond human
19881
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This standard for imprkvisibilit was strictly applied by the Cour
de cassation27 in SocitO Air Nautique c. ISSTA. 23 An Israeli stu-
dent organization contracted for flights to Israel with an air charter
company in February 1965. That summer, the French Transport
Ministry halted flights to Israel, and the Israeli student group sued
the charter company for breach of contract. The Cour de cassation
upheld the claim, stating that it was foreseeable that flights would
be suspended, and that the charter company bore the risk of
damages.29
Another common requirement in French law is ext~riorit (be-
yond a party's control). The rationale for this requirement is that
force majeure precludes finding either party at fault, and therefore
the superseding event must be beyond the control of the parties."0
Thus French courts hold that the obligation to pay on a certain
date is not avoided simply because the obligee is too sick to make
the closing.3 1 However, when a strike within a company is traceable
to national labor unrest, French courts have held that the event is
beyond the employer's control and may be grounds for force
majeure.5 2
expectations at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Because if it was foresee-
able, the obligor had the duty to take the additional precautions in order to evade it;
taken to its logical conclusion, the obligor must abstain from contracting rather than
confronting the risk.)
J. CARBONNIER, supra note 25, at 291.
27. The Cour de cassation is the highest court in France. Generally, the Cour de cas-
sation does not decide a case on its merits, but reviews the judgment rendered by the lower
court, to ensure it is in accord with the law. 0. KAHN-FREUND, C. UvY & B. RUDDEN, A
SOURCEBOOK ON FRENCH LAW 275-76 (1979).
28. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1970, Cass., 1970 Bulletin des arrets de la Cour de cassation,
premi6re section civile [Bull. Civ. 1.) no. 320.
29. Id.
30. Jean Carbonnier observes:
L'Cv6nement emp~chant l'ex6cution n'est liberatoire qu'A la condition de se produire
en dehors de la sphere dont le d6biteur doit r6pondre. Ainsi, la d6faillance du mat-
riel ou du personnel qu'un contractant emploie A 'ex6cution du contrat peut bien
6tre irresistible et impr6visible pour lui; mais comme elle est survenue A l'int6rieur
de son entreprise, il ne peut s'en pr6valoir comme d'une force majeure.
(The event preventing performance does not release the parties except under the
condition that it occurs outside the sphere to which the obligor must respond. Thus,
the failure of material or personnel that a contractant employs for the performance
of the contract may well be insurmountable and unforeseeable; but as it happens
within the confines of his business, he can not invoke it as a force majeure.)
J. CARBONNIER, supra note 25, at 291.
31. A. WEILL, supra note 21, at 477.
32. Id. at 460.
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2. Common Law
a. Interpretation of Contracts. French lawyers will recognize
that many of the difficulties of contract interpretation that arise in
French law also arise in the American legal system. Applying ob-
jective or subjective interpretation creates as much tension in com-
mon law as in French law.33 Like French courts, American courts
look at trade usage, course of dealing, course of performance and
all circumstances surrounding the contract to interpret terms within
the contract. 4
Furthermore, the common law tradition contains several maxims
of interpretation. The most relevant maxim is contra preferentum.3 5
Since it is often the seller who drafts the clause and declares hard-
ship, this maxim has the same effect as article 1602 of the Code
civil, which states that ambiguous clauses are construed against the
seller.36
However, there are also idiosyncracies in the common law system
which the French attorney should appreciate. The first is the parole
evidence rule. This rule states that if a contract is fully integrated
(i.e., self-contained), the court will not look at precontractual nego-
tiations in determining the duties of the parties in a contract.3 "
Moreover, courts will enforce merger clauses, which are clauses in
a contract stating in essence that the contract is fully integrated. 8
Nevertheless, in interpreting ambiguous phrases such as "hardship"
and "gross inequity," courts will permit evidence of precontractual
negotiations, usage, course of dealing and other surrounding
circumstances.39
Another complicated area is whether interpretation will be ef-
fected by the judge or the jury. In general, questions of law are
decided by the judge and questions of fact are decided by the
jury.4 0 Interpreting an ambiguous phrase, such as "hardship" or
33. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 113-16. The basic conflict is
whether to interpret the contract objectively, according to the contract language and the
actions of the parties, or whether to interpret the contract subjectively, according to what
each party intended the contract to mean.
34. Id. at 492.
35. E. Allan Farnsworth defines the maxim thus: "[i]f language supplied by one party
is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that
is less favorable to the party who supplied the language is preferred." Id. at 499.
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
37. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 452.
38. Id. at 457-58.
39. Id. at 492-93.
40. See FED. R. EvID. 1008.
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"gross inequity," that has differing reasonable inferences will nor-
mally be a question for the jury. However, if the evidence before a
court indicates a meaning different from the literal one, some
courts treat this as a question of law for the judge to decide."1
b. Impossibility. The way the law of force majeure appears in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts42 and in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.) may appear alien to French lawyers. 4 The
phrase "contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made" contains no references
to either imprbvisibilit or extbriorit . Nevertheless, these two no-
tions are subsumed within the common law of impossibility.
American courts consider foreseeability to be an important re-
quirement for impossibility. In Eastern Airlines v. Gulf Oil Corp.,44
the Southern District of Florida wrestled with a classic hardship
fact pattern. Gulf Oil declared force majeure and breached a con-
tract on the ground that the energy crisis had caused a rise in the
price of foreign crude oil such that its performance was no longer
commercially practicable.
The court rejected Gulf's defense on the ground that political in-
stability in the Middle East at the time of contracting made the
energy crisis legally foreseeable. The court stated in dicta:
[Elven if Gulf had established great hardship under U.C.C. § 2-
615, which it has not, Gulf would not prevail because the events
associated with the so-called energy crisis were reasonably fore-
seeable at the time the contract was executed. If a contingency is
foreseeable, it and its consequences are taken outside the scope of
U.C.C. § 2-615, because the party disadvantaged by fruition on
the contingency might have protected himself in his contract.4 5
American courts also refuse to find impossibility if the supersed-
ing event was within a party's control. This was the rationale be-
hind the famous opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Canadian In-
41. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 517.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979), states: "Where, after a
contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the oc-
currence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or
the circumstances indicate the contrary."
43. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978), relates to impossibility and the non-delivery and tardy
delivery of goods: "[d]elay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or part by the seller ... is not
a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made ......
44. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
45. Id. at 441.
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dustrial Alcohol Corp. v. Dunbar Molasses Co." The court
decided that a middleman who contracted to sell molasses from a
specific refinery was not excused when the refinery cut back its pro-
duction. The court reasoned that the middleman could "by a timely
contract with the refinery ... have assured itself of a supply suffi-
cient for its needs.'4 7
3. Conclusion
In cases of interpretation, the old adage holds true: an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure. Parties can avoid many inter-
pretation problems by identifying the general type of hardships
they wish to avoid and including them as precisely as possible
within a hardship clause. If broad coverage is sought, then words
like "gross inequity" and "unduly onerous or burdensome" might
suffice. But if parties wish to protect against an increase in cost,
then they should specify this, possibly even demarcating the
fluctuation.
An example of an awkwardly drafted clause is contained in
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission:4"
"If either party should suffer a gross inequity as a result of the
formula failing to fairly reflect cost changes, such inequities will be
resolved by mutual agreement between BN [Burlington Northern]
and the shipper."' 9 This clause contains broad elements (i.e., "gross
inequity") qualified by narrow elements (i.e., "failing to fairly re-
flect cost changes"). On the one hand, lawyers for the shipper could
have argued that a small percentage rise in costs does not constitute
a "gross inequity" and does not trigger the hardship clause. On the
other hand, if Burlington Northern wanted to protect itself against
a rise in costs, it should have avoided the "gross inequity" language
completely when drafting the hardship clause.60 Moreover, Burling-
ton Northern could have included a numerical range rather than
the vague words "fairly reflect" to describe the cost change trigger-
ing hardship.
46. 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932). Cardozo was Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals.
47. Id. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384.
48. 664 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 571 n.3.
50. A suggested wording is: "In the event the formula fails to fairly reflect cost
change, the parties will negotiate a revision of the formula."
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B. What is the "Duty to Renegotiate" and What Happens
When a Party Breaches that Duty?
A major difference between a hardship clause and voluntary
modification of a contract is that a hardship clause creates a duty
to renegotiate. 1 The power of a hardship clause is proportional to
the scope and enforceability of the duty to renegotiate. A clause
that enumerates specific duties, calling for money damages or spe-
cific performance in the event of breach, can induce an evasive
party to come to the bargaining table.
Only a few French or common law cases discuss a breach of the
duty to renegotiate under a hardship clause or a gross inequity
clause.52 Yet this possibility is not difficult to imagine. In the event
of an oil crisis, a buyer who has an assured supply of oil at a low
price will be reticent about renegotiating. The seller will be very
eager to revise the contract and may sue the buyer for breach of
the duty to renegotiate. Alternatively, in the event of a plunge in
the price of oil, the buyer will be eager to revise the contract and
may end up suing the seller for breach of the hardship clause.
The actual wording of the hardship clause may help to clarify
the duty to renegotiate. For example, some clauses are mandatory
(e.g., "shall negotiate") while other clauses are permissive (e.g.,
"may negotiate"). However, given the vagueness of most hardship
clauses, it is likely that the wording will cause disagreement.
1. Duty to Renegotiate
a. Common Law. The sole duty to renegotiate case involving a
gross inequity clause is Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc.53 Burlington Northern (a railroad company)
entered a twenty-five year coal shipment contract with Southwest-
ern Electric Power Corporation (SWEPCO). The contract con-
tained an escalation formula and a gross inequity clause.
Approximately four years after performance commenced, Bur-
lington Northern sought to adjust its tariff pursuant to the gross
inequity clause, and the parties entered into negotiations.
SWEPCO rejected the railroad's proposal, but Burlington North-
ern went ahead and published a new rate. SWEPCO first went to
51. See supra notes 5 & 10.
52. See, e.g., E.D.F. c. St6. Shell Frangaise, Cass., J.C.P. II No. 18810 (1976); South-
western Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
53. 475 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
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the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.), then to federal dis-
trict court and sued for breach of contract.
The Eastern District of Texas held:
Under the tariff and rate schedule agreed to by the parties,
should the railroads feel that the rate specified as escalated is not
adequately compensatory, the Defendant railroads can rely on the
gross inequity provision and negotiate with Southwestern Electric
Power Company for a mutually agreeable higher rate. . . .By
announcing an intention to publish a rate that was not acceptable
to Southwestern Electric Power Company, the Defendant rail-
roads acted in violation of the agreed-to-procedures, and it is the
intent of this court to prevent such breach from occurring."
Southwestern Electric holds that it is a breach of the duty to rene-
gotiate for a party to unilaterally impose new rates. However, it
does not lay out a general standard that identifies when contracting
parties must renegotiate. Nonetheless, it is clear that the court was
not happy with Burlington Northern's negotiation methods which
the I.C.C. labeled "bait and switch tactics." 5 Thus, the case im-
plies a duty approaching a "good faith" standard.
A "good faith" standard was adopted for precontractual negotia-
tions in Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Industries.56 In this case, Itek
sued Chicago Aerial Industries (CAI) for breach of a promise to
buy Itek's assets. CAI, after receiving a more favorable offer, tele-
graphed Itek that it would not proceed with the transaction.
The legal controversy focused on a letter of intent confirming the
terms of the proposed sale of assets:
Itek and CAI shall make every reasonable effort to agree upon
and have prepared as quickly as possible a contract providing for
the foregoing purchase by Itek and sale by CAI . . .embodying
the above terms and such other terms and conditions as the par-
ties shall agree upon. If they fail to agree upon and execute such
a contract they shall be under no further obligation to one
another.57
Itek sued CAI for breach of contract, but the trial court granted
summary judgement for CAI. The court relied on the language
54. Id. at 521.
55. Id. at 515.
56. 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968). For an informative up-to-date analysis of the duty to
negotiate in precontractual contexts, see Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Prelimi-
nary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 263-69
(1987).
57. Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., 248 A.2d at 627.
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above, stating that the parties agreed to release themselves from all
further obligations if they could not come to an agreement.
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, reasoning that:
[I]t is apparent that the parties obligated themselves to 'make
every reasonable effort' to agree upon a formal contract, and only
if such effort failed were they absolved from 'further obligation'
for having 'failed' to agree upon and execute a formal contract..
• CAI willfully failed to negotiate in good faith and to make
,every reasonable effort' to agree upon a formal contract, as it was
required to do.5'8
b. French Law. French case law has not clarified when parties
have a duty to renegotiate. Thus, it is especially important for at-
torneys to pay attention to the particular wording of the hardship
clause they are interpreting. The criteria for renegotiation varies
from contract to contract.5 9
Scholars offer several ideas concerning the duty to renegotiate.
Bruno Oppetit opines that the parties must renegotiate in good
faith. 0 Indeed, the standard of good faith is a notion that underlies
all contract performance in French law. Article 1134 of the Code
civil provides: "Legally formed agreements become the law that
governs those who have made them.... They must be performed in
good faith.""
Michel Fontaine offers a different opinion. He writes that the
duty to renegotiate can be considered an obligation de moyens
(duty of means)." 2 The obligation de moyens requires a party to
take measures which a bon p~re de famille (the French reasonable
person) would take to achieve the purpose of the contract. The clas-
sic example of an obligation de moyens is the obligation owed by a
58. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
59. Compare "the parties will use their best endeavors to agree to such an action as
may be needed" with "les parties se doivent de rechercher en commun les moyens aptes A
rem6dier A la situation ptejudiciable." ("The parties must together search for the appropri-
ate means to remedy the prejudicial situation.") The former clause sets down a "best endeav-
ors" standard while the latter clause is ambiguous.
60. See B. OPPETIT, supra note 2, at 807.
61. C. civ. art. 1134 (Dalloz ed. 1972). "Les conventions 16galement form.es tiennent
lieu de loi A ceux qui les ont faites .... Elles doivent 8tre execut6es de bonne foi."
62. See Fontaine, 2 DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L, supra note 9, at 75. French law distin-
guishes between an obligation de moyens (duty of means) and an obligation de rsultat
(duty of result). An obligation de moyens merely requires that a party meet a standard of
performance, while an obligation de risultat requires that a party actually complete per-
formance. An example of an obligation de moyens is the seller's duty to care for goods
before shipment. An example of an obligation de r4sultat is the buyer's duty to pay for
goods received. See B. NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACTS 49-50 (1982); A. WEILL,
supra note 21, at 442-47.
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doctor to his patients. He is not obligated to cure each and every
patient, but he is obligated to exercise due diligence.63
Thus, in Michel Fontaine's opinion, the duty to renegotiate in
French law is higher than the good faith standard in common law.
While this may cause some consternation, it is likely to have little
practical effect. In most instances, both parties will present differ-
ent proposals and apply the greatest leverage possible. One party's
claim for breach of the duty to renegotiate will often be equally as
valid as the other party's counterclaim.
2. Remedies for Breach
Once it is ascertained that a breach has occurred, two types of
remedies are possible: (1) specific performance (i.e., a court order
that the delinquent party renegotiate in good faith), or injunction
(i.e., a court order that a delinquent party refrain from acting con-
trary to his covenant to renegotiate in good faith); and (2) money
damages. Specific performance or injunction is usually a more ap-
propriate remedy. In hardship clauses, which normally contain the
phrase "agree to renegotiate," an equitable remedy serves the de-
clared intention of the parties-to renegotiate.
a. Common Law. A preliminary injunction was the relief
granted in Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Burlington North-
ern, Inc. :64
[T]his Court . . . order[s] that the Defendants be and they are
hereby restrained and enjoined from doing any act or failing to do
any act ... that would increase the rate for the movement of coal
in unit trains and shipper-owned cars from Wyoming above the
rate provided for in said agreement of the parties and escalations
contained there-in, subject to review of the I.C.C., including any
agreement between the parties pursuant to the gross inequities
clause of said agreement calling for a higher tariff, until such
time as there is an adjudication of the matters raised in said
Complaint.65
However, money damages have also been ordered in precontrac-
tual negotiation contexts. In Heyer Products Co. v. United States,66
the United States Court of Claims held that a disappointed low
63. Fontaine, 2 DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L, supra note 9, at 75.
64. 475 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
65. Id. at 524.
66. 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (disappointed low bidder on a contract with the
Army Ordinance Corps sues United States government).
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bidder could recover bid preparation expenses if he could show the
bids were not invited in good faith, but as a pretense to conceal the
true purpose to award the contract to another formal bidder.6 7 In
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.," the Wisconsin Supreme Court
required the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for losses he rea-
sonably incurred in reliance upon a negotiating proposal which the
defendant subsequently withdrew. 9
However, these cases do not satisfactorily reflect the situation in
which an injured party might find himself in a hardship context.
Remember that the injured buyer wants 1) a steady supply of
goods, 2) at a cheaper price. The injured seller wants 1) a contin-
ued commitment to receive the goods, 2) at a higher price. In es-
sence, the parties want the court to impose the most favorable
price. The buyer or seller is, in effect, asking the court to devise a
reasonable price assuming the negotiations were conducted in good
faith and, more significantly, assuming the parties came to an
agreement.
It is doubtful a court would go so far as to impose a new price.
Labor law provides an appropriate analogy. The National Labor
Relations Act section 158(d) 70 requires parties to negotiate in good
faith. However, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, while the
National Labor Relations Board can order a party to cease and
desist from refusing to bargain, it may not order a party to include
a particular term in the agreement. 71 Thus the best a party can
hope for is a remedy which causes the delinquent party to return to
the bargaining table.
b. French Law. Remedies available in French courts are similar
to common law remedies. French law recognizes both money dam-
ages and specific performance. Moreover, the problems associated
with the valuation of money damages are likely to be the same.
While there appear to be no hardship clause cases involving a
failure to renegotiate properly, Electricit de France c. Socit&
Shell Franqaise7 1 is instructive. In this case, a utility and an oil
company engaged in negotiations pursuant to the hardship clause in
67. Id. at 414.
68. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) (former bakery owner sues supermarket
chain on promise to grant franchise).
69. Id. at 690, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
71. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
72. Cass., J.C.P. 11 No. 18810 (1976). This case is discussed more fully infra notes 86-
96 and accompanying text.
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their contract. Although they renegotiated in good faith, the parties
were unable to reach an accord and submitted their dispute to the
court.
The Cour d'appel de Paris7" ordered the parties to return to the
bargaining table. While this case may indicate that a French court
will order a delinquent party to renegotiate in good faith, Electric-
it de France c. Soci&t Shell Franqaise is easily distinguished from
a duty to renegotiate case. In Electricit de France, the parties
evinced a desire to return to the bargaining table; in a duty to rene-
gotiate case, one party usually wants to block an agreement.
Although French law recognizes compensatory damages, it is dif-
ficult for a court to evaluate the expectationary interest in a duty to
renegotiate context. French law requires that damages reflect only
those injuries which are the immediate consequences of the
breach. 74 Since it is impossible to discern whether the parties would
have reached an agreement if they had properly renegotiated, a
French court may refrain from valuating damages based on a re-
vised price. If the delinquent party continued to supply/accept
goods at the original price and merely refused to negotiate a revi-
sion, then money damages may be negligible. In such a case, the
injured party may prefer specific performance as a remedy.
C. What Happens if Parties Cannot Agree to a Modification?
Contrary to scholarly opinion, the most common problem relat-
ing to hardship clauses does not involve the meaning of "hardship."
Rather it involves parties who agree hardship has occurred, negoti-
ate in good faith, but fail to agree to a modification. In such a case,
parties will look to alternative forums such as arbitration or adjudi-
cation. Two common scenarios will be considered: (1) the hardship
clause is in a contract not containing an arbitration clause and the
parties adjudicate their dispute; and (2) the hardship clause is
within the scope of an arbitration clause, and the parties submit
their negotiations to arbitration.
1. Adjudication
a. Common Law. Most of the common law cases involving
gross inequity clauses concern long-term agreements concluded by
73. The Cours d'appel are regional courts of appeal. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, C. Lvy
& B. RUDDEN, supra note 27, at 275-77.
74. See DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 6.03[5] (M. Bender ed. 1987).
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Burlington Northern Railroad Company and various coal shippers
in the late 1960s. 5 After the October War of 1973, which led to
the energy crisis of the early 1970s, transportation costs rose stead-
ily, and Burlington Northern initiated hardship clause rate negotia-
tions. When the fuel shippers rejected its proposals, Burlington
Northern went ahead and published new rates with the Interstate
Commerce Commission (I.C.C.).
In Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.76 and
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 7
the fuel shippers petitioned the I.C.C. for review of the new tariffs,
and in both instances the tariffs were suspended. Burlington North-
ern appealed the I.C.C. decisions in federal court. The courts held
that it was not an abuse of discretion for the I.C.C. to construe the
gross inequity clauses found in the contracts to suspend the tariffs
and permit the parties to attempt another round of negotiations.78
In Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 9 the facts were slightly different. After negotiations with
Southwestern Electric (SWEPCO) failed, Burlington Northern
published its own tariffs, and SWEPCO petitioned the I.C.C. for
review. The I.C.C. reviewed the rates and neither rejected nor ac-
cepted them. SWEPCO then took its breach of contract case to
federal district court.
The federal court for the Eastern District of Texas enjoined Bur-
lington Northern from breaching the contract. The court held that
although the railroad breached the gross inequity clause by publish-
ing new tariffs, it did not breach the clause by petitioning the
I.C.C. after negotiations failed: "Should negotiations break down,
as they apparently have in this case, and agreement on a higher
rate becomes impossible, it is implied in the contract as a matter of
law that the defendant railroads could petition the I.C.C. for a de-
termination of a reasonable rate."80
The court did not answer the crucial question of whether parties
can also petition a judicial court for determination of a reasonable
rate. Traditionally, American jurisprudence eschews court-imposed
75. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
76. 647 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
77. 664 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1981).
78. See Iowa Power and Light Co., 647 F.2d at 809; Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 664
F.2d at 576.
79. 475 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
80. Id. at 521.
[Vol. 19
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol19/iss1/6
HARDSHIP CLAUSES
modification of contracts.8 1 Exceptions do exist, however. Alumi-
num Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.," is the best known case
in which a court did modify the price term in a contract. The case
involved a sixteen-year agreement by Alcoa to convert alumina sup-
plied by Essex into molten aluminum.
The contract contained an escalation clause8" based on the
wholesale price index (WPI). The WPI did not keep up with the
sharp rise in energy costs in the middle 1970s, and Alcoa stood to
lose over $60 million during the balance of the contract term.
The federal court for the Western District of Pennsylvania modi-
fied the price term, finding a mutual mistake of fact. The court
explained: "At stake in this suit is the future of a commercially
important device-the long-term contract .... If the law refused an
appropriate remedy when a prudently drafted long-term contract
goes badly awry, . . . [p]rudent business people would avoid using
this sensible business tool." '84
The major argument for court-imposed modification is that it
provides a fairer result and strengthens the long-term contract as a
legal instrument. The major arguments against court-imposed mod-
ification are that it places too great a burden on the courts and that
it is contrary to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.85 The pacta
sunt servanda argument, however, is somewhat weakened in the
context of hardship clauses, since part of the agreement of the par-
ties is to revise the contract in the event of a gross inequity.
b. French Law. The foremost opinion involving a hardship
clause in French law is Electricit de France c. Socit Shell Fran-
qaise.88 The case involved a ten-year fuel oil supply contract be-
tween E.D.F. and Shell Francaise. The contract contained both an
indexation clause and a hardship clause with the following
elements:
If the price of fuel sustains vis-a-vis its initial value a rise or fall
of more than 6 francs-a-ton; the parties should come together to
examine the modifications to be brought to the contract; should
they fail to agree, E.D.F. shall have the right to rescind the con-
81. See generally, Spiedel, Court Imposed Price Adjustments under Long-Term Sup-
ply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1981).
82. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
83. An escalation clause fixes price according to a formula tied to the market price. E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 200.
84. 449 F. Supp. at 89.
85. Pacta sunt servanda is the fundamental principle that agreements of the parties to
a contract must be observed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (5th ed. 1979).
86. Cass., J.C.P. II No. 18810 (1976).
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tract in the case of an increase in price and Shell shall have the
same right in the case of a decrease in price."
The indexation clause contained a floor price and a ceiling price.
Due to the sharp rise in the price of crude oil following the October
War, the floor price exceeded the ceiling price and the indexation
clause created the "absurd result"88 that the sale price was below
cost.
The parties attempted to renegotiate under the hardship clause
but failed to reach an agreement. They brought their dispute to
court. The Tribunal de commerce de Paris, the trial court, declared
that it was bound to act "within the will of the parties"8 and it
could not invent an indexation clause. It refused to modify the
contract.
The Cour d'appel de Paris offered a more inventive solution. It
appointed an observer to aid the parties in attempting another
round of negotiations. If the parties failed to reach an agreement
after six months, they were permitted to return to court to seek a
modification of the indexation clause. The court would then deter-
mine whether revision was possible. For, if the required changes
would modify the basis on which the contract was formed, the court
would not intervene. 90
This case is important because the court was able to offer a
unique yet sensible solution while remaining within the jurispru-
dence classique (traditional legal system).91 French case law tradi-
tionally views court-imposed modification as an infringement of the
will of the contracting parties (l'autonomie de la volont des par-
ties). French courts are more sensitive than American courts on
this subject because the Cour de cassation steadfastly refuses to
introduce the doctrine of imprvision, which exists in administra-
tive law, into the private law of contracts.92
87. Id. note J. Robert.
Si le prix du fuel subissait par rapport A sa valeur initiale une hausse ou une baisse
de plus de 6 francs A la tonne; les parties se rapprocheraient pour examiner les
modifications A apporter au contrat; faute d'accord E.D.F. aurait la faculte de
r6silier le contrat en cas de hausse et Shell en cas de baisse.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court declared it would act "dans la limite des volont~s des parties."
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See A. WEILL, supra note 21, at 401; J. GHESTON, LES OBLIGATIONS (II) 106
(1980); M. LE GALCHER-BARON, LES OBLIGATIONS 79 (1980). American lawyers should ap-
preciate the distinction between droit privi (private law) and droit public (public or admin-
istrative law). Droit priv4 governs private entities while droit public governs all matters in-
volving the French administration.
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The doctrine of imprvision, recognized since 1916, 1 permits ad-
ministrative law courts to repair contracts that become inequitable
due to "unforeseen contingencies."" Administrative law courts are
empowered to direct the payment of an indemnity (indemnit
d'imprbvision) to the party injured by the unforeseen contingency
to restore balance to the contract. The rationale for this doctrine is
that public interest mandates that these contracts be performed and
that the private entities should not be discouraged from contracting
with the government.
Jean-Louis Delvolv6 argues that Electricit de France c. Societe
Shell Franeaise signals adoption of the doctrine of imprvision in
private contract law.95 This is not the case. While the judgment
rendered by the Cour d'appel de Paris was inventive, the court's
reasoning was well within the jurisprudence classique. The court
based its power to modify the contract on the widely accepted prac-
tice of judicial courts to fix defective indexation clauses. Moreover,
it distinguished the facts of the case based on the quasi-public na-
ture of E.D.F.96 Thus Electricit de France c. Socit Shell Fran-
Caise provides an uncertain indication of the way in which a court
will handle a contract between different private parties.
Not only are droit public rules, such as impr~vision, different from rules of droit priv4,
but there are also distinct court systems. In the private law system, there are several courts
of first impression, such as the tribunal d'instance and the tribunal de commerce, but in the
administrative system there is only one, the tribunal administratif. In the private law system
the highest court is the Cour de cassation, while in the administrative system the highest
court is the Conseil d'Etat.
93. The doctrine of imprbvision was established by the Conseil d'Etat in Gaz de Bor-
deaux, P6riodique et critique [D.P.] 3, 25 (1916). The court modified a fuel concession con-
tract because of a sharp rise in the cost of gas during World War I. The price increase
exceeded the escalation formula provided in the contract.
94. Jean-Louis Delvolv6 defines "unforeseen contingency" as:
[A] situation in which the balance of a contract is upset as a result of an event of a
general character, which is either political or most often economic, which is, in any
case, independent of the intention of the parties, and which was unforeseeable on
the signing of the contract, and which, without making performance by the adminis-
tration's opposite contracting party impossible, makes the carrying out of his obliga-
tion intolerably onerous.
J.L. Delvolv6, The French Law of "Imprbvision" in International Contracts, 2 INT'L CONT.
3, 5 (1981).
95. Id. at 8.
96. "I1 leur appartient donc ... de substituer ... une formule qui assure i E.D.F. pour
chaque cat6gorie de fuel, un prix d'achat reduit en rapport avec l'importance exceptionelle
des fournitures en quantit6 comme en dur6e et la mission de service public de cet organ-
isme." ("It is up to them therefore ... to substitute ... a formula that assures E.D.F. for
each category of fuel, a reduced purchase price in relation to the exceptional character of the
supplies, both in terms of quantity and duration, and the public service mission of this or-
ganization.") E.D.F. c. St6. Shell Frangaise, Cass., J.D.P. 11 No. 18810 (1976) (emphasis
added).
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2. Arbitration
In some ways, an arbitration clause can simplify matters. When
parties agree to submit unresolved hardship negotiations to arbitra-
tion, the arbitration panel will not feel the same compunction as a
judicial court in imposing a price adjustment. However, the inter-
pretation of arbitration clauses presents problems of its own.
a. Common Law. The best known common law case involving a
gross inequity clause is Georgia Power v. Cimarron Coal Corp.9
Georgia Power entered into a ten year agreement with Cimarron
Coal Corporation to purchase coal at $4.03 per ton. The contract
contained both a gross inequity clause98 and an arbitration clause."
During 1973 and 1974 the market price of coal rapidly escalated.
Relying on the gross inequity clause, Cimarron Coal sought an up-
ward adjustment of the base price. After several rejections, Georgia
Power finally agreed to negotiate an increase in the price to $10.41
per ton.
Several months later, as the market price of coal continued to
rise, Cimarron Coal notified Georgia Power that it would cut off
supplies unless the utility agreed to an increase in price or submit-
ted the price dispute to arbitration. Georgia Power sought a tempo-
rary restraining order in federal district court to prevent Cimarron
from cutting off coal supplies. Georgia Power also requested a de-
claratory judgment that an increase in price was not arbitrable
since, under the gross inequity clause, the parties agreed to negoti-
ate the price themselves.
The lower court held the dispute was arbitrable, and on appeal
the Sixth Circuit affirmed:
When the parties to a contract foresee the possibilities of a
97. 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
98. The gross inequity clause stated:
Any gross proven inequity that may result in unusual economic conditions not
contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution of this Agreement may be
corrected by mutual consent. Each party shall in the case of a claim of gross ineq-
uity furnish the other with whatever documentary evidence may be necessary to
assist in affecting a settlement.
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving either the Pur-
chaser or Seller from any of its respective obligations hereunder solely because of a
claim of inequity or the failure of the parties to reach an agreement with respect
thereto.
Id. at 103.
99. The arbitration clause stated: "Any unresolved controversy between the parties,
arising under this agreement shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to arbitration
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The cost and expense of any arbi-
tration shall be shared equally by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the arbitrator." Id.
at 104.
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change in circumstances which might require modification of the
contractual terms and provide for modification by mutual consent,
and thereafter are unable to agree upon such modification, the
resulting dispute is subject to a broad arbitration provision such
as that contained in the Agreement now before the court. The
fact that contracting parties agree in general to arbitration of dis-
putes indicates a determination that their interests will be better
served by arbitration than by resort to courts if problems arise'"
The court in Georgia Power can be criticized for failing to ade-
quately consider Georgia Power's argument that submission of the
dispute to arbitration would defeat the parties' intention to negoti-
ate a revision among themselves. The court's analysis should have
distinguished between two situations. In the first, the parties negoti-
ate in good faith but fail to reach an agreement. When this hap-
pens, it is reasonable that the parties would, upon reaching an im-
passe, submit their negotiations to arbitration. In the second
situation, one party fails to fulfill its duty to negotiate in good faith.
When this occurs, the delinquent party could exploit the arbitration
clause to circumvent negotiations. A clever arbitration panel would
require the delinquent party to return to the bargaining table
before imposing an arbitral decree. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit
should have distinguished between the two situations and ordered
the parties to renegotiate.
b. French Law. French hardship clauses are sometimes located
within contracts containing arbitration clauses. Recent legislation
in France has focused on international arbitration, which is broadly
defined as the arbitration of issues involving international com-
merce.10 1 Arbitral decisions are enforced pursuant to an ordon-
nance d'exquatur issued by a tribunal de grande instance.'
Hardship clauses are often subject to third party intervention, by
an expert, which is not the same as arbitration. 08 French scholars
are sensitive to the distinction between intervention d'un tiers (third
party intervention by conciliation or irrevocable expertise) and arbi-
tration.'" While a judge enforcing an arbitral decree will only ex-
amine the form of the award, a judge examining an expert's opin-
100. Id. at 106.
101. CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE art. 1492.
102. Id. at art. 1500.
103. Fontaine, 2 DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L, supra note 9, at 76.
104. See id. at 39; B. OPPETIT, supra note 2, at 808; E.D.F. c. St6. Shell Franmaise,
Cass., J.C.P. II No. 18810 (1976) note J. Robert.
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ion will look at the substance as well.' 05
Michel Fontaine explains the significance of this distinction:
The distinction is far from being academic. Arbitration in the
classical sense conforms to a precise procedure; compliance with
the arbitration award can be enforced through a confirmation by
a court. These rules do not apply to irrevocable expertise. It is not
certain which procedure is applicable if the parties have specified
nothing (are there any 'rights of the defendant' to be respected,
must the decision mention its ground, etc . . . ?); the expert's
conclusions are integrated into the contract and any dispute aris-
ing in this connection can be brought before the courts.1"6
In a hardship context, this distinction may have little practical
value if the arbitration panel or expert merely revises a price term.
But if an expert tinkers with the actual wording of contract clauses,
this distinction takes on great material importance. When the con-
tract is altered, a court might be willing to attack the expert's
judgment.
CONCLUSION
Hardship clauses are increasingly familiar to French and Ameri-
can lawyers. Although they appear in a variety of contexts, 01 they
are most often used in long-term contracts to provide flexibility in
the event of unforeseen or unusual conditions. 08 Without a hard-
ship clause, contract revision is difficult to organize, and termina-
tion or breach is more likely to occur.
Lawyers in various countries recognize the usefulness of hardship
clauses.' 09 Private international law institutions are especially ac-
tive in this area. Within the last year, articles on hardship clauses
were published by UNIDROIT 11° and UNCITRAL."1 ' These arti-
cles note the flexibility of hardship clauses and offer examples of
how they may be drafted to suit different circumstances.
Parties that choose to include a hardship clause in their contract
must understand the basic function of the clause and how it will be
105. Fontaine, 2 DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L, supra note 9, at 39.
106. Fontaine, 2 DR. PRAC. COM. INT'L, supra note 9, at 79.
107. See supra text accompanying note 3.
108. See supra text accompanying note 4.
109. See, e.g., van Dunne, Contractual Revision of Contracts in Dutch Law, in
NETHERLANDS REPORT TO THE TWELFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CORPORATION
LAW 75, 89 (1975); C. SCHMITTHOFF, EXPORT TRADE 648 (8th ed. 1986).
110. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
[UNIDROIT], Principles for International Commercial Contracts, Study L, Doc. 37 (1987).
111. UNCITRAL, supra note 5.
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enforced. A typical hardship clause contains: 1) a definition of
hardship--normally, some change in economic circumstances; and
2) an agreeable method to modify the contract-normally, some
form of negotiation. 1 2
If the parties cannot agree whether an event triggers a hardship
clause, how does a court interpret hardship? Courts often look to
legal analogies, like force majeure or impossibility, but judges
should remember that hardship is not a legal concept with a fixed
meaning. A hardship clause is designed to incorporate flexibility
into a contract, so that parties will renegotiate rather than termi-
nate the agreement. 1 3
Parties must be aware of their duty to renegotiate and the conse-
quences that will arise if they breach this duty. In common law, the
duty to renegotiate entails a good faith standard, while in French
law the standard appears to be higher. 1 Although a court may
order money damages for breach of this duty, the more appropriate
remedy is specific performance or injunctive relief.11 5
Finally, parties should realize that even if they agree that a hard-
ship has occurred and negotiate in good faith, they may not agree
to a modification. Failure to agree to a modification poses a difficult
problem, because courts are reluctant to impose their own
modification.
In the leading American case involving a hardship clause, Geor-
gia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Co.," 6 the court enforced a con-
tract's arbitration clause when the parties were unable to success-
fully renegotiate a new price for coal pursuant to a hardship
clause.1 17 Even when an arbitration clause is present, courts should
pay careful attention to the provisions for renegotiation contained
in the hardship clause. Renegotiation is as efficient as arbitration,
and a negotiated settlement may be more acceptable to contracting
parties than an arbitral decree.
In the leading French case, Electricit de France c. Socit Shell
Franqaise,"8 the court appointed an observer to aid the parties' ne-
gotiations. If the parties were unable to reach an agreement, they
were permitted to return to court to seek a modification of the con-
112. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
113. See supra text accompanying note 19.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
116. 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975) , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
118. Cass., J.D.P. 11 No. 18810 (1976).
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tract. 19 The Cour d'appel de Paris demonstrated an appreciation
of the underlying purposes of the hardship clause. For this reason,
Electricit de France c. Socitb Shell Franaise presents a forward-
looking approach capable of guiding courts and parties through the
infancy of hardship jurisprudence.
119. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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